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 It seems to me to be appropriate to begin this discussion with a short resume of 
Saul Kripke's contributions to the massive Wittgensteinian library focused on rule 
following. Wittgenstein states PI 201. 
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because 
every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to 
conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

 Kripke suggests that Wittgenstein's achievement in revealing this paradox is one 
of the towering achievements of the PI, fundamental to much of our understanding 
(or lack of understanding) of analytical philosophy. So, in brief, what is it that 
Wittgenstein has uncovered that Kripke finds so important?
  "What you are saying, then, comes to this: a new insight —
intuition — is needed at every step to carry out the order '-f-n' cor#rectly." — To 
carry it out correctly! How is it decided what is the rightstep to take at any 
particular stage? — "The right step is the one that
accords with the order — as it was meant" — So when you gave the
order -\-z you meant that he was to write 1002 after 1000 — and did
you also mean that he should write 1868 after 1866, and 100036
after 100034, and so on — an infinite number of such propositions? —
"No: what I meant was, that he should write the next but one number
after every number that he wrote; and from this all those propositions
follow in turn." — But that is just what is in question: what, at any stage,
does follow from that sentence. Or, again, what, at any stage we are to
call "being in accord" with that sentence (and with the mean-ing you
then put into the sentence — whatever that may have consisted in). It
would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was needed
at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage. PI 186

"But I already knew, at the time when I gave the order, that
he ought to write 1002 after 1000." — Certainly; and you can also say
you meant it then; only you should not let yourself be misled by the
grammar of the words "know" and "mean". For you don't want to say that you thought 
of the step from 1000 to 1002 at that time—
and even if you did think of this step, still you did not think of other
ones. When you said "I already knew at the time ..... " that meant
something like: "If I had then been asked what number should be
written after 1000, I should have replied '1002'." And that I don't
doubt. This assumption is rather of the same kind as: "If he had fallen
into the water then, I should have jumped in after him".—Now, what
was wrong with your idea?   PI 187
 
Some may say that understanding a rule means getting the right interpretation. The 
trouble with this is that any interpretation can be reinterpreted, and this could 
be carried on ad infinitum. When meeting practical situations it may well be, as 
Wittgenstein freely admits, that an individual may well have an interpretation that 
works for him or her in these particular set of circumstances. The problem that 
Wittgenstein has uncovered is to do with discovering a 'correct' interpretation 
that works in all circumstances for all time.
 Taking a closer look at the above we find that Wittgenstein first opens the book 
on the rule following controversy at PI 85 – So I can say that the signpost does 
after all leave room for doubt. (PI 85) 

Wittgenstein's suggestion here is clear enough, there is room for doubt. After all 
the signpost is a static entity, it is the language user who makes the 
interpretation. Now an interlocutor might say that signposts are stated using 
language or symbols. But clearly the same situation applies, an interpretation is 
called for. Now here we can add a rider, that may help on our way. If an individual 
makes an interpretation on numerous occasions, and if these interpretations give a 
result that is compatible with what the afore mentioned individual requires, then 
can we say this is 'correct'? Well, it may be said that it is correct for that 
individual in that time frame, but it certainly can't be said that it is 
necessarily correct for any other individual in any other time frame. So the 
meaning of a word or of a sign must be more than this. For example the word lamp 
may seem to me to have a certain meaning. But that meaning, or those meanings, are 
the ones that I am familiar with. We can probably now discern that the word lamp 
has an infinity of meanings through interpretation. 

 Wittgenstein states - 198. "But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this 
point?
Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule."—
That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still
hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it
any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning  PI 198

Of course, as we indicated earlier, one interpretation by one individual at one 
point in time can give rise, in fact must give rise, to other interpretations by 
other individuals at other points in time. If we seek to enact a rule then 
interpretations are a very inadequate and inconclusive way of doing it. This brings 
into sharp focus the question as to whether, so far in our deliberations, there can 
be any way of determining the meaning of a rule.
 There are those who look for a solution in the form of a 'last interpretation'. 
But what would such a solution look like? For an interpretation to be a 'last 
interpretation' i.e. a form of final arbitor, we must purge it of all normativity. 
(Why? Because otherwise it would just be like any other interpretation, capable of 
being reinterpreted countless times. It would in fact be favoured as a normative 
solution, and that normativity destroys any hope of taking it outside of human 
interpretation, and subject to the whims of normative human activuty i.e. favoured 
by human understanding or human frailty. To be a final interpretation it must be 
incapable of another interpretation, and the only way this can be accomplished by 
taking it outside the realms of human interpretation) 
 But then we must ask what does 'taking it out outside the realms of human 
interpretation' mean? It surely cannot mean that there is no connection between the 
human interpretation and the final interpretation. If this were so then we cannot 
even outline the state of affairs. But of course we must outline the state of 
affairs, as these are the very essence of the human condition in this particular 
context, and if we absent ourselves from the human condition we must, by 
defination, absent ourselves from the very problem that we are attempting to solve. 
So the interpretation avenue leads to a form of sceptisism. 
  Even positing some final interpretation that is not yet accessible to us only 
postpones the problem, or maybe fuels the fires of scepticism. Wittgenstein puts it 
like this -  "what we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are 
clearing up the ground of language on which they stand" PI 118. Wittgenstein's aim, 
which he states again and again, is to provide us with a pathway out of the 
incertitude, misconceptions and misunderstanding that have resulted from western 
traditions of understanding. These traditions were rooted in the belief that 
language was centred in the psychological domain of the individual human being, 
beliefs that appear self evident, are based on 'common sense' and therefore have 
gone largely without question. Backed by a Cartesian theory of mind, 'Cogito Ergo 
Sum', and Augustine's ideas on language development, these ideas seemed 
unassailable.
  Wittgenstein's arguments were based on the notion that these ideas sow the 
misconceptions and misunderstandings that we spoke of earlier. As outlined previouslyWittgenstein raises inter alia the fact that if any interpretation of a rule can be succeeded by a new interpretation how do we know which meaning, if any, is the 
correct one. The quest for meaning is mired in obfuscation, and therefore a useless 
pursuit.
  And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practise. And to think one
is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it PI 202
So Wittgenstein asserts that obeying a rule is a practise, and follows that with 
the pronouncement that it is an impossibility to follow a rule privately, as 
private rule following would be a cerebral phenomina, and as such is not 
necessarily obeying a rule in practise, but merely equating thinking one was 
obeying a rule with actually obeying it. 'following a rule is a practise' has other 
fundamental connotations. A practise in this context is, I believe, implanting the 
normativity of rule following firmly and without equivocation in the linguistic 
communities of which we are a part.
  The idea, therefore, that one should force a solution to the paradox rests on the 
false premise to which Wittgenstein is referring. What is required is in the final 
analysis more the expression of an attitude which is tied to the notion of a form 
of life, thereby severing any connection which might wrongly ally it to the concept 
of knowledge  ‘the epistemically innocent novice requires trust before there can be 
doubt or questioning, and action before there can be reflection or hypothesis 
formation.’
  Meredith Williams (3) leans on Wittgenstein, and here we can restate the quote from PI 201  
"we thereby show that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an 
interpretation, but which, from case to case application is exhibited in what we 
call "following the rule" and "going against it". She suggests, and from our above  
deliberations we concur, we reject the view that rule following relies on 
interpretation and hand in hand with this rejects the view that we then have to 
rely on any sort of sceptical theory of meaning. She mounts a critique of Kripka 
for his constant search for interpretation, to the point that she suggests Kripka's 
view leads towards a communal view of verification rather than an individualistic 
model. According to Williams Kripke is over concerned with validation (epistemic). 
This overconcern leads to a profound misunderstanding of what Wittgenstein is 
trying to achieve.  Kripka charges full ahead along the classical road of 
interpretation, perhaps steering away from truth conditions towards some sort of 
rationalisation argument, which to a degree, perhaps a lesser degree, giving 
explanations where interpretations used to stand. This is a misinterpretation of 
the Wittgensteinian case. Williams suggests that Wittgenstein's answer to the 
paradox (given that he even acknowledges that some answer is required) is  "an 
appeal to the social embeddedness of rules".
 Williams then goes on to discuss the born Crusoe, defined in our deliberations as 
someone who has never experienced social interactions. To bolster her case she 
brings forward evidence regarding children who have not been truly socialised in 
the sense that their involvement in conventional society was none existent, or of a 
limited nature. Now we must proceed with great care here. The evidence that 
Williams evinces is empirical evidence. Now it is a moot point as to whether 
empirical and philosophical dialectic can be run in some sort of tandem. Williams 
makes the point that linguistic deprivation consequent upon actual social isolation 
from birth is well documented. This is true, but William's suggestion here that one 
can go from an 'is' to an 'ought' is not tenable. We are here concerned with 
meaning and conceptualisation, which puts us firmly in the area of philosophy.
  Kripke puts the sceptical case, but it is possible to discern that even he gives 
rule following an overwhelming normative element. The practise of various rule 
driven behaviours e.g. the calculation of an exponent, the starting up of a steam 
engine etc, are things that we do out of habit, by rote, by doing as we have done 
before, and as generations have done before us. We certainly do not feel the need 
to go back to first principles. Nor would the notion that we had to seek 
verification from our community be entertained either. Of course over time these 
behaviours may develop, and this would certainly involve the community, (or 
communities), of which these rule following behaviours formed a part. In this case 
a form of community verification and eventually a form of community agreement would take place, indeed would have to take place.
  Indeed, to take this further, and to some extent agreeing with Williams, without 
a degree of certainty there lies a barren land littered with distraught souls and 
unimaginable suffering. Of course it depends on where that degree is set, and the 
types of question  that the level of certainty is dealing with. Williams offers up 
examples where  ‘mistake is not possible, doubt cannot be entertained, and evidence 
is not required’ (Ibid., 254). Such examples include  ‘that’s a zebra’ or ‘that’s a 
towel’. Now of course we can quibble here, and talk about the difference between a 
towel and a hand clothe, or the difference between a zebra and a Zebroid. But I 
think there is one thing we can agree on, that on questions such as these the 
degree of certainty will be very high. We can lean on Wittgenstein's genius here 
too. Wittgenstein speaks of certainty more in the way of a frame of mind or a way 
of thinking which is  related to a language game, and through that to a Form of 
Life.
  The notion of language game is central to much of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and 
the critique of those who posit the possibility of a private language must be 
confronted on a wide front. Wittgenstein states in PI 158 -
 Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary
about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate
it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day
on which I have the sensation.——I will remark first of all that a
definition of the sign cannot be formulated.—But still I can give myself
a kind of ostensive definition.—How? Can I point to the sensation?
Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and
at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation—and so,
as it were, point to it inwardly
  This is Wittgenstein's private diarist, of which much has been said and much more 
will be added. How can this private diarist name a private sensation? Wittgenstein 
adds PI 158 -
A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign.—Well, that is done 
precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself 
the connexion between the sign and the sensation.—But "I impress it on myself"
can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the
connexion right in the future. And further PI 257 - How has he done this naming of 
pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?—When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the language is 
presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of 
someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the 
grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed. PI 
257

 The private diarist posits that he can, by a way of some ostensive procedure, 
create an impression of S inside himself that will connect the sensation to S. But 
first we must remember that these are machinations carried out in a private 
language, let's take a more detailed look at the implications. The notion of 
private language ostensive definition involves introspection, an individual has a 
sensation, say toothache, or muscle strain etc, and attempts to tie it to a word. 
The person will then recall this word every time he or she encouters this same 
sensation.  But then we must say that this word that our private diarist possesses 
cannot just be seen as an isolated island, as Wittgenstein points out in PI 257 
above. To mean something a word must be used correctly, must be a part of other 
words that make up a meaningful scenario, otherwise the word means nothing. Yet 
again our private diarist  may come back with the notion that a word may be public 
in that it is understood by a number of people, but that only person A can 
understand sensation A, only person B can understand sensation B etc. However, 
let's drill down a little more. If person A cannot fully understand person B's 
sensation and vice versa then at best communication is difficult, and at worst 
communication is none existent. But here the private diarist is on very shaky 
ground. The way words bump together and interlock ('stage setting in the language' 
as Wittgenstein puts it) is essential for language to make sense and acquire 
meaning. If the private diarist is arguing that this is not so, that words bump 
together and do not interlock and that this does not matter. If such interlocking 
does not matter, and of course the meaning of words is embedded in such 
interlocking, then it suggests that meaning has ceased to matter.
  Now let's take a look at sensation terms from another viewpoint. There are those 
that suggest that we can believe that we have, or have had, a first person present 
tense sensation, and that this may be a way around the difficulties that we have 
identified in this article. Wittgenstein's view is stated in PI 258
 'One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right'.
 This statement needs further consideration. On one level the meaning seems plain. 
In the case of a first person present tense sensation what seems to the individual 
involved to be 'right', to be happening, is indeed right and happening. This rules 
out those who suggest that belief is involved, for if belief is involved then so is 
doubt, and Wittgenstein has just ruled out any possibility of doubt in this 
situation. This can be fleshed out thus. We have a first person present tense 
sensation, we know we have a sensation because we have it. Of course one could 
discuss the accuracy of our first person present tense  sensation. But here we put 
the problems of memory aside for a moment and concentrate on that sensation. If it 
wasn't there we wouldn't register it at all. There we can sympathise with 
Wittgenstein's notion that to discuss doubt in this situation is both inappropriate 
and nonsensical. 
  Of course our analysis here blunders into the problem of private language. In the 
first person present tense sensation situation we have a sensation and its 
inappropriateness for doubt in that paricular case, and I suppose that this could 
be called a form of 'private language', but a private language consisting of one 
word only. But that produces our private language problem, this word is floating in 
a sort of void. We could use this word to describe our sensation, but how do we 
check that we are using the word 'right', for if there is no criteria for 
correctness then there is no way to check whether we are using it right or wrong. 
When Wittgenstein states  'One would like to say' this could probably be construed 
as some sort of minimal concession to those who give some credence to the 
possibility of some sort of private language (clearly there are no criteria of 
correctness as in public language, such arguments pertain to the inner, where the 
individual 'impresses upon himself'). Sensations are subjective, and it's perfectly 
reasonable to say that having a sensation S is registered by the individual as that 
sensation. If that individual has a similar sensation it is also perfectly 
plausible to suggest that there is some recognition from the original S. There is 
no criteria of correctness as would be apparent in a public language, but perhaps, 
just perhaps, with his words 'would like to say' Wittgenstein is making an almost 
imperceptible nod towards the possibility of some subjective activity, maybe a 
suggestion of the slight possibility of the inner, which does not contradict in any 
way the public language, i.e. the public language supplies the criteria for 
correctness which is the ultimate guarantor, the ground if you like, of the 
integrity of our discourse. 
 Is it memory that is under consideration here? Let's take another look at PI 265

For example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train 
right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the samehere?"—No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. 
If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, 
how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory?  (As if someone were to 
buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was 
true.)

  So considering Wittgenstein's words carefully it is the testing for correctness 
that is the salient feature. Memory gets no mention here. Wittgenstein talks of 
testing for rightness, not of memory. We cannot test for rightness if we have no 
rightness to test against. The timetable that Wittgenstein speaks of can be 
replaced in our situation by e.g. a grid of sensation experiences. If this grid is 
not present then there is nothing to tell us if our experience is right or is 
wrong. Now rightness or wrongness seem pretty accurate or absolute measures when 
used in this context. But we have nothing to test for such things as similarity 
either, i.e. is this sensation that I have at this point in time in any way similar 
or related to the sensation that I experienced some time ago? Memory is to do with 
our 'inner self', it certainly does nothing to form some sort of independent 
measure of correctness that could be called legitimate in these circumstances. 
Perhaps we require a sensation term be observed to obtain by other people, in 
principle at least? 
  Turning to Wittgenstein again -
it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain!—That means: if anyone said "I do 
not know if what I have got is a pain or something else", we should think something like, he does not know what the English word "pain" means PI 288 

 So Wittgenstein reinforces the notion that sensation terms in the first person 
present tense situation cannot be doubted.
  But this needs fleshing out. It seems clear that, at the present stage in our 
discussions, verification cannot be said to apply to first person conditions such 
as feeling clammy, feeling good (or bad), feeling unsafe etc. Why? Because if I 
seek verification of the sensation 'feeling unsafe' I verify it by feeling unsafe. 
As Wittgenstein puts it, verification in this case doesn't make sense. It is a 
measure of Wittgenstein's genius that this notion ever developed, its influence 
was, and is, profound. (1) p 62 It is also necessary to point out the interweaving 
and inter dependency here of philosophy, psychology and grammatical form. Probably as a result of his mindfulness of such interrelationships Wittgenstein began to use the word Ausserungen for these first person present tense situations with 
psychological interconnections.Now here we must lean heavily on Norman Malcolm (1) pp 62/63 . The noun Ausserung seems to have a number of meanings e.g. announcement, pronouncement, utterance, expression, assertion, statement, observation, remark. Malcolm prefers expression, the reason being that, in his view, Wittgenstein is presenting an analogy between what he describes as first person
psychological sentences and expressive but none linguistic behaviours that can be 
usually associated with and expressive of e.g. pain,
 unhappiness, fear, exultation etc. These are certainly not normal proposition 
thoughts of the form 'High tide in Blackpool yesterday was at 1.00 p.m.'. It is 
self evident that this proposition can be checked against experience so there is a 
profound difference which may justify putting them into a separate category from 
thoughts of the High Tide variety. Wittgenstein states it thus -

 Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, 
expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and 
he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, 
sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour."So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it. PI 244

 These first person present tense experiences are, for Wittgenstein, clearly not 
the same as sentences that express thoughts that can be checked or verified against 
'reality', which many have argued was Wittgenstein's view prior to his 
groundbreaking ideas that are now under discussion. So, Wittgenstein seems to be 
saying that first-person psychological sentences may reflect our sensations of 
pain, worry, exultation etc correctly but in a different way to the one we are used 
to with 'normal' propositional sentences. Now I'm sure there are some who would 
point to Wittgenstein's words, that ideas like  ‘I know I am in pain’ are nonsense. 
But remember, these words, as are all Wittgenstein's words, must be taken in 
context. These words are uttered as a verification for the question 'What is the 
verification for your statement 'I am in pain', and in this context these words 
clearly are nonsense, because the answer to 'I know I am in pain' is back to the 
original exclamation 'I am in pain', the verification is in fact the original 
statement. If I were to say to someone with a toothache "Are you sure you are in 
pain?" he or she would look at me in disbelief. The nature of the question flies in 
the face of logic, it is totally illogical and nonesensical.  This situation is 
self verifying, or one could say (as Wittgenstein's genius has shown) that 
verification has no place in first person present tense situations. 

"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a 
nothing"—Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either! The 
conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about 
which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force 
itself on us here. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the 
idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to 
convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains,
good and evil, or anything else you please. PI 304

So Wittgenstein opens up the idea that language can function in different ways. A 
sensation is 'not a something', but neither is it a 'nothing', it is a 'different'. 
A person may remark "That's thunder" in response to a rumbling sound. One could 
call that a reaction to an external stimuli. It's certainly not a proposition in 
the normal sense, for it may express fear or anxiety, not thoughts about them but 
the fact that these sentiments are stimulated in certain people when thunder is 
threatened.
  Now when Wittgenstein states 'it's not a something' but also 'it's not a nothing' 
he sees something profound. "That's thunder" or "That's a pain" is not a 
proposition in the normal sense, it is, as I remark, a different. But what is a 
different? Or at least how do we get a little closer to what a different is? Well, 
let's look at the antecedent to the utterance. When I utter 'That's a pain' or 
'That's thunder' what mental prosesses does this ignite? Does my mind go though a 
litany of possibilities? Do I stretch back my memory to recollect other such 
occasions? No, I do none of these. The reaction, my reaction, is instantaneous. I 
do not introspect or retrospect. There is no ostensive behaviour. We don't become 
aware because of some epistemic event. Why not? Because we are aware already. Our words which encapsulate a first person present tense psychological event are 
spontaneous, the endeavour is not merely represented by words, the endeavour is the 
words.

And words can be wrung from us,—like a cry. Words can be hard to say: such, for 
example, as are used to effect a renunciation, or to confess a weakness. (Words are 
also deeds.) PI 546

Wittgenstein's notions on language are experiential, and this is clear from the 
above quote. Words have many and varied uses, and in some cases are associated with deeds. As we have pointed out above some words, certainly those used in first 
person present tense psychological situations, do not pass through an  intermediary 
implanted deep inside an individual, they are a spontaneous reaction to a 
situation, and grounded in spontaneous reactions that human beings have brought 
into play since childhood, the cry of pain, the shout for help, attention behaviour 
etc. Anger is expressed by a word, but of course context is important here. An 
expression of anger  would be bellicose, so the whole human being is involved as 
the word becomes the deed, the expression, the passion, all coalesce around the 
word becoming deed.
  Many of these words as deeds are, by definition, reactions to fear, to loathing, 
to danger, to love etc etc. So by this very fact they differentiate themselves from 
other linguistic and grammatical activities. Wittgenstein has introduced us to a 
new form of linguistic activity, a new classification, for it is surely use that 
determines such classifications. One differentiating feature of this classification 
must surely be to do with intention. In many other linguistic and grammatical 
activities intention has a key part to play.  For example I might be walking along 
a street in a strange town and my companion might direct my attention to a 
particular district with the accompanying commentary "There are questionable 
activities down there ". What does this mean?  One intention, perhaps the major 
intention, would be to put me on my guard, a sort of warning. But this intention is 
not mutually exclusive. The intention may in fact be to raise my interest, to set 
my pulse racing. Yet another intention may well be a descriptive one, to fix that 
particular district relative to other districts in the town. The point being here 
is that these intentions, and others, depend upon the language game, depend upon 
the particular situation, depend upon the relationships between the people 
involved, depend upon the context.
  The point about the above example is that a first person present tense 
psychological expression is none of the above, it is a spontaneous event that takes 
place usually in response to some immediate stimuli. I say immediate stimuly 
because we think of a pain, a toothache, a hostile gesture, a friendly gesture etc. 
I say usually because there can be other instances of this type, as pointed out 
above in PI 546. Introspection therefore is not a route to awareness of our 
sensation states, the cognitive, the  epistemic is not the way to awareness of 
first person present tense pychological states. Our emotions, our sensations are 
still there, just as they always have been, but our comprehending of them, the 
essence of knowing them, has been shifted, and shifted quite fundamentally. Some 
have suggested that Wittgenstein has articulated a new sub category of speech here. 
There is even more significance. Wittgenstein always rejected existing paradigms, 
or at the very least subjected them to detailed scrutiny. The notions that we touch 
on here, of new categories of language are precisely in the vein of thought and 
action. It may well be that after submitting existing ideas to detailed scrutiny we 
afirm them, or take some of their messages onboard. But the central theme is clear.
  As to a new category of speech, what we can say is that first person present 
tense psychological occurencies are certainly different from 'normal' uses of 
language. A major difference is that such occurences are spontaneous, another that 
they are ovewhelmingly reactive. The former tells us that such an occurence does 
not follow 'normal' language rules, they are not propositions which can be analysed 
as true or false. This in itself may suggest to some that the 'normal' proposition 
and first person present tense psychological happenings do indeed fall into 
different categories, the chasm between them so wide and mutually exclusive. 
 But wait, one thing that nags at me again and again is this quote touched on 
earlier ‘In most cases, the meaning of a word is its use’. Couple this with 
Wittgenstein's view that language has many uses and maybe we are a little further 
on in our quest. One of the developments of Wittgenstein's thought from the 
Tractatus to the Investigations, some would argue one of the most important 
developments, was that we should reset our outlook on language, reality and truth 
to a more flexible and dynamic interplay, one that considers, and constantly 
reappraises, the notion that language has many uses, many manifestations. 

  The language of the first person present tense psychological episode may not be 
viewed in the same way as the propositional episode,
the authority standardly granted to a subject's own beliefs, or expressed avowals, 
about his intentional states is a constitutive principle:something which is not a consequence of the nature of those states, and an associated epistemologically privileged relation in which the subject stands to them, but enters primitively into the conditions of identification of what a subject believes,hopes and intends. p. 142 (2)

  So Wittgenstein suggests we  re-evaluate our perception of first person present 
tense terms in a fundamental way. The subject enjoys a privileged epistemological 
relationship for his or her own introspection. This relationship loosens the bonds 
that hitherto have arguably been a sine qua non of any discussions or theoretics in 
this area. The relations that formerly were essential such as truth conditions 
appertaining for propositions are no longer so, they can be reassessed. An 
individual may also be thought to have certain rights or privileges that relate to 
his/her own introspections that ought to be respected. Self interpretation must 
surely override other interpretations of an individuals psychological state unless 
or until the reasons for setting such self interpretations aside are so strong, so 
compelling, as to be obvious to the informed observer. The individual is willing, 
no, more than that, eager, to avow certain introspections about himself/herself, 
and as stated earlier such self knowledge must, in any society recognising the 
autonomy of a human being, be viewed as asserting the very humanity of the human 
person.
  However we should consider another point that raises itself here. The situation 
of spontenaity could be challenged by a discerning interlocutor. Say we take an 
individual who experiences a toothache. The toothache is not so severe as to make 
our individual call out, that would be a spontaneous response and encapsulated in 
our previous discussions. But let's say that this individual, for reasons best 
known to himself or herself, wants to give the impression that he or she hasn't got 
toothache. Then he or she wouldn't utter a sound, or if questionned about his 
toothache may say that it didn't exist. Clearly this is not a spontaneous response 
in the same way as a 'different' was as outlined above,  nor is it a reflex action 
as we normally understand such things. So where does that leave our brave new world which questions the notion regarding privileged epistemological relationship?
 For brevity let's call our new relationship privileged1. Privileged1 exists where, 
for some reason or other, the individual has a sensation (pain, toothache) which 
arguably does not cause a spontaneous response and which the individual seeks to 
deny, or falsify, or some other such response. Or we could say that this 
'different' is spomtaneous in the sense that this individual has programmed himself 
to react in that way if someone enquires about his toothache? Do we not have to 
apply the 'normal' rules of truth for such propositions? But clearly replying to 
someone who asks "Have you got toothache?" with a negative, when in fact the 
individual has got toothache cannot be tested in the same way as someone saying 
"High tide at Fleetwood is at 12 noon today". Why can such a negative not be tested 
in the same way?. Well, with a proposition as "High tide at Fleetwood is at 12 noon 
today" can be tested by observing the situation at 12 noon. The negative answer to 
the toothache question is a version of the first person present tense psychological 
utterence. It is not the reflex action which happens with spontaneity. privileged1 
happens after cognition, but the self programming can perhaps be seen as near spontaneous, and there is still a privileged epistemological 
relationship, privileged1 is the product of introspection, albeit of a different 
kind. 
 As Wittgenstein notes - The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break 
with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the
same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains,
good and evil, or anything else you please. PI 304

So here Wittgenstein states it, what we have been groping for. We should envisage 
language that functions in different ways in different circumstances. This suggests 
that evaluating the truth of a first person present tense psychological statement 
(avowals as some have said) must be considered in a way that can make progress. As 
considered above a different kind of truth can be envisaged with the first person 
present tense psychological statement. Indeed our discussions suggest that a 
different kind of truth must be envisaged to make progress. But then again, is it 
so much of a different kind of truth? privileged1 is a state, and eventually a 
statement, derived from the position of privilaged access that only he/she enjoys. 
A false statement would represent the view of privilege with just as much validity 
as a statement describing a 'true' state of affairs, therefore it is the intention 
of the individual that is brought into this situation. It is his/her intention to 
relate the state of affairs revealed by his/her introspection to the wider world.

 It is the subjects view of his/her own introspection that produces, in relation to 
first person present tense psychological statements, the subject's stance, 
contention, hopes, fears based on his own epistemology, his own mind set and the 
pressures and ideas that press upon him or her, in other words it is the intention 
of the subject that in first person present tense or near present tense situations 
that assumes great importance. It may seem at times that we are groping in the 
dark, chasing shadows that forever outdistance us, but we are at least chasing 
these shadows, casting a timorous light that at times illuminates an illusive 
corner.   In that sense his/her introspection gives a true reflection of a subjects 
epistemology, for, one could argue, how could it be otherwise? The subjects 
description derived from introspection is, in fact, the only description. It could 
be argued that groping for truth leads at the very least to discovering that in 
this situation at this time there is no truth in the accepted and tidy fashion. 
 In fact it may be a better and more meaningful choice of words to speak more in terms of a report in relation to first person present tense psychological statements of this type in which the individual, for his or her own reasons, purposfully gives and inaccurate description of e.g. his or her physical state. But we must remember that this report is accurate to the individual involved in that it describes what the individual wants to evince, it incorporates and is an expression of his or her intention.
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